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	26 June 1987		
WESTERN EUROPE:	ONGOING COUNTERTERRORI	ST COOPERATION	
	Summary		
counterterrorist cooperations have been manifest and national. The Eurosanctions against Libya among its members, and extradition policies and Europe (COE) has provide battle against terrorism intelligence services has obstacles to extradition legislation has been sti	raging shows of determinates remain divided among gressively and following ans argue that to do so the same area by the same welcome and may be the same and may be the same and the same are welcome and may be the same and the same are welcome and may be the same are welcome.	onths. Encouraging national, bilateral, imposed limited are more information ate more uniform while, the Council of non-EC members in the , police and to share information, n, and domestic ation in combating themselves about the the US lead too is to expose their the Office of Eurpean y be addressed to Chief.	25X 25X 25X 25X
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countries to terrorist retaliation, to endanger their political and economic interests in the Third World, and to appear to be fronting for Washington. Disclosures of deliveries of US arms to Iran and media stories alleging that Syria--not Libya--was responsible for the La Belle discotheque bombing in West Berlin last year have strengthened the voices of those who argue for caution. Moreover, recent major counterterrorist successes against terrorist groups--in Spain and France, for example--coupled with a general decrease in terrorist activity in Europe also have removed some of the urgency that enabled governments to expand their powers to combat terrorism.

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West European governments are generally supportive of a more sustained and systematic policy of cooperation against terrorism and are cognizant of the public benefits of a high counterterrorist profile. The UK in particular has sustained a vigorous antiterrorist policy against countries such as Libya and Syria, and Italy has signed antiterrorist accords with a number of countries. In general, European leaders will press ahead with regional and bilateral cooperation but will move cautiously in enacting further antiterrorist legislation that might cause judicial and political controversy and complicate policy coordination in multilateral forums.

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Multilateral Vehicles for European Counterterrorist Cooperation

The European Community

The Trevi Group of interior and justice ministers is one of the two main vehicles for promoting cooperation among the members of the EC. The group is chaired by the country holding the revolving six-month presidency of the EC, an arrangement which makes for variations in the intensity with which the Group pursues its tasks. Belgian Justice Minister Gol succeeded this year in setting up a small permanent administrative office for Trevi, which should help to counteract the disruption caused by the rotating chairmanship. He also continued a number of initiatives begun earlier, particularly on strengthening controls to prevent the movement of terrorists across international borders. A working group on immigration is exploring methods of curtailing the flow of asylum seekers, and the Twelve are exchanging information on terrorist suspects through a secure communications network.

The most recent Trevi meeting this April outlined new moves to include information about thefts of arms and explosives and forged passports in data exchanges. Participants also agreed to propose making airlines and shipping companies responsible for people arriving without proper documents. West Germany and Denmark already have such laws, and the British recently passed similar legislation.

EPC Working Group on Terrorism. A second major vehicle for cooperation within the EC is a group established by the EC Foreign Ministers in 1986. It functions as one of the regular working groups in European Political Cooperation (EPC)—the member states' foreign policy coordination system. Organizational matters are still being resolved, however, and the working relationship with the Trevi group has yet to be clarified.

EC Foreign Ministers. State-sponsored terrorism has come under increasing scrutiny in the EC. Minor sanctions were agreed by the EC Foreign Ministers against Libya in April and against Syria in November 1986 (see Annex A). Most members, however, remain hesitant about applying strong measures—economic sanctions or breaking diplomatic relations, for example—because of their political and economic stakes in these countries. Even though EC sanctions theoretically remain in place, relations with Syria appear to be warming, and Belgium and West Germany have returned their ambassadors to Damascus. Syrian claims of a shutdown of Abu Nidal activites in Syria is likely to give some additional impetus toward improving relations with EC countries. Only the British have remained adamant in their opposition to any relaxation of EC sanctions

A noteworthy development has been the willingness of EC members occasionally to forgo consensus. The Foreign Ministers condemned Syria last November and the Trevi group agreed on a terrorist threat assessment for Western Europe in December even though Greece refused to sign the formal documents in either case. Greece, citing its aversion to "naming names" on terrorism, probably will continue to set itself apart on this issue.

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		This EC group has made	
progress in efforts to si are lengthy and complicat telefax request sent by o is being submitted to each	ted. A proposed new one Ministry of Just ch country's judicia	w procedure would invo- tice to another. Sinc al specialists to cons	olve a simple ce the proposal sider questions
of sovereignty, however,	agreement probably	will be delayed for s	several months.
Cooperation with the US a	and Other Non-Member	rs	
	ates has no formal r ceedings. Attorney ne past, current, an	— relationship with EC g General—Meese has met nd next chairmanmost	t three times t recently in
troika, and Switzerland h briefings has varied acco our judgment the Danes, w the Belgians and British	nas indicated it wis ording to the dispos who chair the group have been. The US	shes to do so. The the sition of the presidir next, may not be as fewill be allowed to part of the state of t	noroughness of ng country. In forthcoming as articipate in
technical conferences sucintervention units and mapreparing threat assessment	ch as those held by ay be asked to share	airport security chie	efs and special
The EPC working ground countries, but consultating Working-level exchanges we upon by some membersparas less important than in able to obtain informal recontacts are unlikely.	ions require prior a with countries such rticularly Francew ntra-European cooper	as the United States which views cooperationation. The United St	Ical Committee. are frowned on with the US tates is often
Council of Europe			
The 21-member Council activities. The COE's re exert moral pressure on E terrorism. A COE ministe example, coincided with E produced a declaration co diplomatic privileges. P the Vienna Conventions on size of diplomatic missio used in a manner incompat	esolutions are non-b European capitals to erial conference on EC debates on Syrian endemning terrorism Participants agreed a Diplomatic and Con ons and stress that	terrorism last November in terrorism last November in terror and a resolution on a to tighten the implemental Relations, which the premises of a mississipplemental to the premises of a mississipplemental terror and ter	e served to tions against per, for prism and abuse of mentation of the limit the ssion not be
			nce Greece
*In addition to the Ireland, Italy, Luxembour Kingdom, and West Germany	g, the Netherlands, the Council of Eu	Portugal, Spain, the crope includes Austria	e United ., Cyprus,
Ireland, Italy, Luxembour	g, the Netherlands, the Council of Eu	Portugal, Spain, the crope includes Austria	e United ., Cyprus,

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cited specifically, members agreed they would endeavor to adopt a joint position with regard to states that encourage acts of terrorism.	25X1
The COE also has made progress in bringing all its members under the 1977 European Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism, also known as the Strasbourg Convention. This convention states that specific violent crimes such as hijacking, hostage taking, and attacks on internationally protected persons are to be considered extraditable crimes. Many countries have until now refused to extradite offenders who have claimed that their acts were "political offenses." The last holdoutsMalta, France, Greece, and Irelandhave now signed the convention and indicated their intention to ratify it. Irish ratification may be delayed pending discussion with the Pritish on	20/11
the controversial no-jury tribunals in Northern Ireland. France has said it will ratify with reservations protecting the right of asylum, as have about half the signatories, thus limiting the positive effects of their adherence.	25 X 1
Justice ministry officials who formed a new COE committee on terrorism met for the first time in Januaryand again in Marchbut made little headway. The committee is charged with developing proposals for closer counterterrorist cooperation among member states, devising ways to impede the movement of terrorists, cooperating with the EC, and informing non-members about ongoing efforts. At the March meeting the group concentrated on using existing committeessuch as a public international law committee and one on the movement of personsto further its work. Full reports are expected at a June committee meeting that will review national legislation on terrorism. The Council of Ministers has yet to resolve the question of cooperation with non-Council countries.	25X1
Non-EC members clearly want an increased role for the Council. Most EC states, however, are reluctant to expand the COE's antiterrorism role and prefer the Trevi group as the primary vehicle for counterterrorist cooperation. They consider the COE too large and unwieldy a forum for effective operational cooperation and are particularly hesitant to include in their deliberations countries such as Malta and Cyprus, which have close ties to some radical Arab states.	25X1
One previously neglected area in which the Council may have some impact is media coverage of terrorism. After a contentious debate at its January session, the COE's Council of Ministers agreed that the Secretary General should contact European media organizations with an eye toward agreement on guidelines for journalists covering terrorist events.	25 X 1
Economic Summit	
Terrorism has been increasingly discussed since the late 1970s in the annual Economic Summit held by Canada, France, Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom, the United States, and West Germany. Past Summits issued the 1978 Bonn Declaration on aircraft hijacking, the 1980 Venice Declaration on the	
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protection of diplomats, and l Annex B)	.ast year's Tokyo state	ement on terrorism. (See	25X1
of terrorism against civil avi (See Annex C). Agreement by reached in March after the Fre Stiffening the Bonn Declaratio with any country that fails to	tation and to include for the Summit Seven expersence reversed a prior con, which commits the So extradite or prosecut	rts' group was finally decision not to participate. Seven to suspend air traffic	•
fulfilled a commitment made at	the Tokyo Summit.		25 X 1
Such declarations are not taken by Economic Summit membe Afghan airlineshad little ap	ers under the Bonn Decl		0574
	<u> </u>		25X1
Bilateral Cooperation			
In our judgment, one of th	n moet eignificant des	releaments in hilatoral	
cooperation over the past year	has been a trend towa	ard facilitating	
extradition. Of all the West reluctant to compromise its hi			
dissidents of all stripes. The	ese attitudes have now	w begun to change,	
indicating the growth of a Euroterrorism.	opean consensus in fav	or of strong action against	t 25X1
			20/1
French willingness to expeterrorist group, is a notable new Chirac government has used Basques to Spain over the pastinsistence on treating these in previously extradited three Basfor Spanish democracy, but this also have continued to expel Eincluding the first person with	instance of improved be an administrative property year, marking a rever ndividuals as "politic sques to Spain in 1984 s had remained an isolate members to countries.	ocedure to return over 60 rsal of previous government cal" dissidents. France had as a gesture of support lated gesture. The Frenches other than Spain,	
expelled from France.	II TOPMAT SUADAS AS A P	MITCHEST LETTREE CACT OF TO	25X1
The French have also begun terrorists, thus smoothing some			
area. They may also extradite recently. Rome had become income on more than 100 extradition resulting the served a sentence west Germany. It is significant extradited was membership in a the 1951 extradition treaty in	or expel several Red reasingly critical of equests. Paris also a ce for carrying a fals nt that one of the chaterrorist society; pr	Brigades suspects captured the French failure to act agreed to extradite Odfried se passportfrom France to arges for which Hepp was reviously France interpreted	i 25X1
crimes.			2J/\ 1
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·	25 X 1
Growing bilateral cooperation between ministers responsible for internal security is another positive development. Italian Interior Minister Scalfaro has actively pursued accords with the US, France, Austria, Greece, Turkey, Egypt, Spain, and Morocco in an attempt to dispel Italy's reputation for "softness" toward terrorists. These accords cover international terrorism, organized crime, and drug trafficking. In addition, the interior ministers of France and West Germany concluded an antiterrorist agreement in April 1987 that provides for the display of "wanted" posters in both countries and the possible exchange of liaison officers. Bonn and Paris also pledged to discuss "cross-border surveillance." In addition to signing a counterterrorist agreement, France and Spain recently initiated a joint commission to prepare border control agreements. We expect conern over the influx of asylum seekers and the mobility of terrorists to lead to new bilateral arrangements regulating	
borders, even though one EC goal is free movement for citizens of the twelve	
member countries.	25 X 1
Bilateral negotiations for new extradition treaties were begun or concluded between a number of countries over the past year. Many older treaties are so dated that modern crimes, such as terrorism and drug trafficking, are not listed as extraditable offenses. These newer treaties generally broaden the conditions under which offenders can be extradited and narrow the "political offense exception" by removing political motives for certain violent crimes such as murder and hijacking as grounds for denying extradition.	25 X 1
In <u>Britain</u> , Parliament is enacting a bill to overhaul the UK law on extradition. The principal change contained in the bill is the abolition of the requirement that a foreign government must prove a prima facie case against the defendant in British courts before extradition can be approved. Passage of this law will make it easier to implement recent extradition treaties. The UK ratified a new extradition treaty with Spain and signed one with Italy in March 1986. No bilateral agreement with Spain to regulate extradition had existed since Spain denounced a 1978 agreement, and the treaty between Italy and the United Kingdom replaced one dating from 1873. In the past the UK had often denied Italian extradition requests because the evidence was not judged	05744
convincing or was not an offense under British law.	25 X 1
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Cooperation with the United States	
American initiatives have been instrumental in bolstering the willingness of West Europeans to cooperate with the US on extradition matters. The US Senate ratified a supplementary extradition treaty with the United Kingdom in July 1986 aimed primarily at facilitating the extradition of members of the outlawed Provisional Irish Republican Army accused of terrorist acts. The treaty sharply circumscribes the ability of American courts to deny extradition by upholding a defendant's claim that his crime is politically motivated. At the same time, it does permit a court to block an extradition if it believes the accused would not receive a fair trial because of "race, religion, nationality or political opinions."	25 X 1
Other US initiatives to modernize treaties have resulted in the signing in April 1987 of a new treaty with Belgium, which replaces one dating from 1901, and a supplementary extradition treaty with Spain. The treaty with Spain includes a comprehensive limitation of the political crimes defense and obligates both signatories to prosecute domestically in cases where extradition is denied. There also are ongoing talks between the United States and Austria, Switzerland, France, and Luxembourg.	25 X 1
US-French negotiations have been prolonged and, to date, unproductive. There has been some evolution in French jurisprudence and policy toward a more restrictive interpretation of the political motivation arguments when used in defense of terrorists; still the French believe there is a need to consider such circumstances as "historical grievances" or the morality of returning suspects to a repressive regime. Earlier this year the US modified its proposal in an effort to move forward on the treaty negotiations, but the French have not yet responded.	25 X 1
The US request to extradite Mohammed Ali Hammadi from West Germany for complicity in the TWA 847 hijacking has been a particularly sensitive extradition case. Initially Bonn appeared ready to agree, but the kidnaping of two West Germans in Beirut last January made the Kohl government reluctant to meet US requests. Bonn announced its refusal to extradite on 24 June; instead Hammadi will be tried in West Germany on charges of murder and air piracy. Concern for their hostages also makes it unlikely that Bonn will issue an international arrest warrant for the Syrian intelligence officer implicated in last year's bombing of the German-Arab Friendship Society in West Berlin. Bonn clearly would like to avoid alienating Damascus while pressing for assistance	
in freeing the hostages.	25 X 1
Cooperation with the Soviet Union	
The Soviet Union has taken some tentative steps toward negotiating extradition treaties with several Western governments that would provide for the return of terrorist suspects. Discussions with the French, Italians, Canadians, British, and West Germans are unlikely to result in any formal	
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accords because of the Soviet concept of "automatic" extradition. The	
Europeans worry that political dissidents might be termed terrorists and w	
have to be turned over to the Soviets without even a hearing.	25X1
Domestic Legislation.	
Upsurges in violence also impelled some West European governments to ena tougher domestic legislation last year. West Germany	25 X 1
In Decem	0.514
the Bundestag approved legal measures which classified sabotage on railway	•
lines, and plants and firms in the energy supply sector, as punishable	
terrorist offenses. The legislation also gave federal and state police authorities direct access to the central traffic information system to spe	ed up
the search for escape vehicles and expanded the competencies of the federa	-
prosecutor to make him responsible for foreign terrorist groups. A	
controversial provision that would have provided immunity for suspected terrorists whose testimony assists in the conviction of other terrorists w	126
dropped, but a state's witness provision remains a serious consideration.	las
Total amnesty would not be granted for murder, however.	25 X 1
France has experienced violence from both internal groups and foreign	
extremists operating on French soil. A national security council to deal	with
terrorism composed of concerned ministersForeign Affairs, Justice, Inter	ior,
Public Security, and Defensewas set up in April 1986 and met frequently during the wave of bombings in September. Paris' response to the bombings	•
included mandatory visa checks for foreignersexcept for EC nationals and	
Swiss, random identity and security checks in public places, and deploymen	nt of
troops along French borders to combat illegal immigration. According to t Public Security minister, after procedures for expelling illegal foreign	he
residents were simplified, more than 1700 foreigners were thrown out of Fr	ance
in a six-week period during September and October 1986.	25X1
Now love regard last Sentember extended the nomical of preventive dator	tion
New laws passed last September extended the period of preventive deten from two to four days and gave the French government the right to dissolve	
foreign associations "gravely disturbing the peace." The government will	
be able to reduce prison sentences of convicted terrorists willing to info	
their accomplices, while cash rewards have been offered to those who infor police about suspicious persons. To avoid the thorny problem of giving a	
definition to "terrorism," the law states that certain offenses will be	10841
prosecuted as terrorism when they are "linked with an individual or collect	tive
enterprise for the purpose of undermining public order through intimidation terror". Those accused of such offenses are referred to a court made up of the c	
seven professional magistrates, until now used only for espionage cases.	
type of court sentenced LARF leader Georges Abdallah and, more recently, D	
Action member Regis Schleicher to life imprisonment.	. 25X1
In contrast to the toughening of legislation in France and West German	IV.
Belgium is encountering delays in passing a package of judicial reforms th	at
include legalized wiretapping, more stringent gun controls, and freer use	of
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arms by police. <u>Italy and Spain</u> —where the debing—are moderating some of their strong at to lower the number of days a suspect can be Rome just approved a new law aimed at reducing terrorists who have renounced their former in	ntiterrorist laws. Madrid intends kept in preventive detention, and g the sentences of repentant eology. On balance, however, both	
Rome and Madrid will continue to pursue relat	ively tough policies.	25)
Outlook. Continued disclosures of links desire to convince their publics of their defaction, and the hostage situation in Lebanon on terrorism in Western Europe this year and	ermination to take effective will continue to focus attention	
governments to press ahead in counterterroris		25>
Thus, practical cooperation in such areas passports, more effective arrangements for exapproach to the problems of illegal immigration asylum can be expected to continue. The EC, frontier procedures within the Community but controls at external frontiers. Many EC courstricter travel controls, but are unlikely to requirement for entry visas for citizens of requirement for entry visas for citizens.	tradition, and a more unified on and abuse of the right of for example, plans to simplify will attempt to strengthen tries are already enforcing go along with France's	25 X
EC members have been less hesitant than in nations sponsoring terrorism but see economic ineffective and largely unenforceable. They retaliation; most do not agree with US claims last year was legally justifiable as "self-de Barring new revelations of state involvement unilateral action by the US or another power, any additional steps.	sanctions as being both are even more opposed to military that the attack against Libya fense" under the UN Charter. in terrorism or the prospect of	25X
Governments probably will move slowly in legislation for fear of negative political coare voicing concern that, in combating terror much power to the state and the police. Ever first European country to introduce an identicomputers, its introduction was delayed for a opposition by civil liberties groups. The Freservations about a planned computerized identification.	nsequences. Civil libertarians ists, governments are shifting too though West Germany became the ty card that can be read by our years because of strong ench have expressed similar	05)
courts.		25 X
The increased willingness of police force share information marks a departure from traccontributed to a number of recent arrests of Spain, and France. Long-standing problems of responsibilities, and confusion remain, however still lack a central counterterrorist coordinations services and components that deal with lack the financial and personnel resources to	itional attitudes and has terrorist suspects in Italy, competition, rivalry, overlapping er. For example, France and Italy ator with authority over the h terrorism. Many states also	
counterterrorist policies.		25
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While there are some prospects for constructive activity at a bilateral and regional level, cooperation in multilateral organizations probably will continue to be limited. Even where agreements can be reached, variations in legal systems and domestic policy considerations often create enforcement problems. We believe strong collective action will be elusive in organizations such as the Council of Europe and the Summit Seven, where declarations are not legally binding.

ANNEX A

EC Foreign Ministers Counterterrorist Actions in 1986	
January 27. The Ministers decided to establish a permanent working body to promote and monitor common action to discourage terrorism, particularly in the areas of security at airports, ports and railway stations; visa and border controls; and abuse of diplomatic immunity. They also agreed to ban the export of military equipment to countries that support terrorism, and to try to prevent their citizens and industries from taking commercial advantage of antiterrorism sanctions.	25 X 1
April 14-21. The Ministers met at the request of Italy and Spain, following Libyan threats to attack targets in those countries. They agreed to restrict the movements of Libyan diplomats, reduce their numbers, and demand stricter visa requirements of Libyan nationals. The ministers met again April 17 in Paris and urged the US not to strike Libya again. On April 21 the foreign ministers met in Luxembourg and agreed to additional measures. The new steps, adopted over the objections of Greece, included:	
A "significant" reduction in the number of Libyan diplomatic personnel and missions in the EC and of EC diplomats in Libya.	
Restrictions on the movement of Libyan diplomats within the EC, including travel prohibitions confining them to the capitals or cities where Libyan missions are situated.	
A study on the number of Libyans nationals working in other Libyan organizations like airlines or trade offices.	
The expulsion of all Libyans suspected of terrorism and a ban on their residing anywhere else in the EC.	25 X 1
November 10. After the UK broke off diplomatic relations with Syria, the Ministersunable to reach agreement on 28 Octoberfinally agreed to implement a package of sanctions against Syria, including banning arms sales, suspending high-level visits, curbs on Syrian diplomatic activity, and tighter security around the state-run Syrian Arab airlines.	25X1
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ANNEX B

Bonn Economic Summit Declaration (July 1978)

The heads of state and government, concerned about terrorism and the taking of hostages, declare that their governments will intensify their joint efforts to combat international terrorism.

To this end, in cases where a country refuses extradition or prosecution of those who have hijacked an aircraft and/or do not return such aircraft, the heads of state and government are jointly resolved that their governments should take immediate action to cease all flights to that country.

At the same time, their governments will initiate action to halt all incoming flights from that country or from any country by the airlines of the country concerned. The heads of state and government urge other governments to join them in this commitment.

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At the June 1984 London Summit members pledged:

- -- closer cooperation and coordination between police and security organisations and other relevant authorities, especially in the exchange of information, intelligence and technical knowledge;
- -- scrutiny by each country of gaps in its national legislation which might be exploited by terrorists;
- -- use of the powers of the receiving state under the Vienna Convention in such matters as the size of diplomatic missions, and the number of buildings enjoying diplomatic immunity;
- -- action by each country to review the sale of weapons to states supporting terrorism;
- -- consultation and as far as possible cooperation over the expulsion or exclusion from their countries of known terrorists, including persons of diplomatic status involved in terrorism.

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At the May 1986 Tokyo Summit leaders issued a joint statement vowing to fight terrorism "relentlessly and without compromise." While singling out Libya by name as a target for action, it stopped short of imposing economic sanctions. Six political and diplomatic actions were set forth that the summit nations could take against nations supporting terrorism. These measures included:

- -- a ban on arms exports;
- -- strict restrictions and possible closure of diplomatic missions;
- -- improved extradition procedures;

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the denial of entry into any of suspects, including diplomats, b	
stricter immigration and visa re	quirements; and
Members also agreed to make the	between police and security services. 1978 Bonn Declaration more effective in
dealing with terrorism affecting	civil aviation. 25X

ANNEX C

Venice Summit Terrorism Statement (June 1987)

We, the Heads of State or Government of seven major democracies and the Representatives of the European Community assembled here in Venice, profoundly aware of our peoples' concern at the threat posed by terrorism:

Reaffirm our commitment to the statements on terrorism made at previous Summits, in Bonn, Venice, Ottawa, London and Tokyo,

resolutely condemn all forms of terrorism including aircraft hijackings and hostage-taking, and reiterate our belief that whatever its motives, terrorism has no justification,

confirm the commitment of each of us to the principle of making no concessions to terrorists or their sponsors,

remain resolved to apply, in respect of any state clearly involved in sponsoring or supporting international terrorism, effective measures within the framework of international law and in our own jurisdictions,

welcome the progress made in international cooperation against terrorism since we last met in Tokyo in May 1986, and in particular the initiative taken by France and Germany to convene in May in Paris a meeting of ministers of nine countries, who are responsible for counterterrorism,

reaffirm our determination to combat terrorism both through national measures and through international cooperation among ourselves and with others, when appropriate, and therefore renew our appeal to all like-minded countries to consolidate and extend international cooperation in all appropriate fora,

will continue our efforts to improve the safety of travellers. We welcome improvements in airport and maritime security, and encourage the work of the ICAO (International Civil Aviation Organization) and IMO (International Maritime Organization) in this regard.

Each of us will continue to monitor closely the activities of airlines which raise security problems. The heads of state of Government have decided on measures, annexed to this statement, to make the 1978 Bonn Declaration more effective in dealing with all forms of terrorism affecting civil aviation,

and commit ourselves to support the rule of law in bringing terrorists to justice. Each of us pledges increased cooperation in the relevant fora and within the framework of domestic and international law on the investigation, apprehension and prosecution of terrorists.

In particular, we reaffirm the principle established by relevant international conventions of trying or extraditing, according to national laws and those international conventions, those who have perpetrated acts of terrorism.

The following annex was released with the statement:

They recall that in their Tokyo statement of International Terrorism they agreed to make the 1978 Bonn Declaration more effective in dealing with all forms of terrorism affecting civil aviation. To this end, in cases where a

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country refuses extradition or prosecution of those who have committed offenses described in the Montreal Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Civil Aviation and/or does not return the aircraft involved, the heads of state and government are jointly resolved that their governments shall take immediate action to cease all flights to that country.

At the same time, their governments will initiate action to halt all incoming flights from that country or from any country by the airlines of the country concerned.

The heads of state and government intend also to extend the Bonn Declaration in due time to cover any future relevant amendment to the above convention or any other aviation Conventions relating to the extradition or prosecution of the offenders.

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DDI/EURA/IA/RPI

24 June 87

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SUBJECT: Western Europe: Ongoing Counterterrorist Cooperation

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